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91-740.ZS
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
NIXON v. UNITED STATES et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 91-740. Argued October 14, 1992-Decided January 13, 1993
After petitioner Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court, was
convicted of federal crimes and sentenced to prison, the House of
Representatives adopted articles of impeachment against him and
presented them to the Senate. Following proceedings pursuant to
Senate Rule XI-which allows a committee of Senators to hear
evidence against an impeached individual and to report that evidence
to the full Senate-the Senate voted to convict Nixon, and the
presiding officer entered judgment removing him from his judgeship.
He then commenced the present suit for a declaratory judgment and
reinstatement of his judicial salary and privileges, arguing that,
because Senate Rule XI prohibits the whole Senate from taking part
in the evidentiary hearings, it violates the first sentence of the
Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, 3, cl. 6, which
provides that the ``Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Im-
peachments.'' The District Court held that his claim was nonjustici-
able, i. e., involved a political question that could not be resolved by
the courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment
Trial Clause is nonjusticiable. Pp.3-13.
(a)A controversy is nonjusticiable where there is ``a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it . . . .'' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217. These two concepts are not completely separate; the lack of
judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that
there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.
Pp.3-4.
(b)The language and structure of Art. I, 3, cl. 6, demonstrate a
textual commitment of impeachment to the Senate. Nixon's argu-
ment that the use of the word ``try'' in the Clause's first sentence
impliedly requires a judicial-style trial by the full Senate that is
subject to judicial review is rejected. The conclusion that ``try'' lacks
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of
review is compelled by older and modern dictionary definitions, and
is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements
that the Clause's second and third sentences do impose-that the
Senate's members must be under oath or affirmation, that a two-
thirds vote is required to convict, and that the Chief Justice presides
when the President is tried-the precise nature of which suggests
that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on
the form of the Senate proceedings. The Clause's first sentence must
instead be read as a grant of authority to the Senate to determine
whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted, and the
common sense and dictionary meanings of the word ``sole'' indicate
that this authority is reposed in the Senate alone. Nixon's attempts
to negate the significance of ``sole'' are unavailing, while his alterna-
tive reading of the word as requiring impeachment only by the full
Senate is unnatural and would impose on the Senate additional
procedural requirements that would be inconsistent with the three
express limitations that the Clause sets out. A review of the Consti-
tutional Convention's history and the contemporary commentary
supports a reading of the constitutional language as deliberately
placing the impeachment power in the Legislature, with no judicial
involvement, even for the limited purpose of judicial review.
Pp.4-11.
(c)Justiciability is also refuted by (1) the lack of finality inherent
in exposing the country's political life-particularly if the President
were impeached-to months, or perhaps years, of chaos during
judicial review of Senate impeachment proceedings, or during any
retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first
judgment of conviction were invalidated, and by (2) the difficulty of
fashioning judicial relief other than simply setting aside the Senate's
judgment of conviction. See Baker, supra, at 210. Pp.11-12.
(d)A holding of nonjusticiability is consistent with this Court's
opinion in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486. Unlike the situation
in that case, there is no separate constitutional provision which could
be defeated by allowing the Senate final authority to determine the
meaning of the word ``try'' in Art. I, 3, cl. 6. While courts possess
power to review legislative action that transgresses identifiable
textual limits, the word ``try'' does not provide such a limit on the
authority committed to the Senate. Pp.12-13.
290 U.S. App. D.C. 420, 938 F. 2d 239, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. White, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which Blackmun, J., joined. Souter,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.